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The degree of bargaining centralisation is widely perceived as an important
determinant of macroeconomic performance and economic competitiveness. The
economic rationale behind the idea that the bargaining or union structure has
considerable impact on the behaviour of real wages and unemployment is primarily
rooted in the work of Calmfors and Driffill (1988). According to their line of reasoning,
countries with decentralised bargaining structures are generally expected to out-perform
countries with intermediate centralised industry-level bargaining in terms of real wages
and unemployment. A core assumption of the Calmfors-Driffill  model is that union
cooperation takes place between firms or industries producing substitutable goods and
that workers are organised by either firm- or industry-specific unions. However, there is
another relevant dimension of centralisation which refers to the professional line since
workers of different professions may be organised in separate craft unions. This type of
(de)centralisation is commonly labelled as ‘horizontal’ (de)centralisation, whereas
cooperation across firms or industries is usually referred to as ‘vertical’ centralisation.
Although it has been widely recognised in the literature that the effects of the two types
of centralisation are likely to work into opposite directions, no comprehensive analysis
has been undertaken yet so as to combine vertical and horizontal centralisation. The
present analysis attempts to fill this gap and integrates the two dimensions along which
centralisation may occur into one modelling framework. As country-specific bargaining
structures typically vary along horizontal as well as vertical lines, such an analysis
proves to be particularly important in order to evaluate the relative wage performance of
different bargaining structures in an international context. In an international context,
the fact that cooperation may take place across crafts, firms/industries, or both raises forexample the interesting question whether completely decentralised bargaining structures
with firm-specific craft unions (like in the UK) still out-perform sectoral centralised
bargaining, e.g. in Germany, where industry unions typically encompass all workers of
a particular industry. It will be shown that, when taking into account the different
centralisation dimensions, wage outcomes of different bargaining regimes cannot
simply be ranked according to the degree of bargaining centralisation. The argument
will be that negotiated wages rather depend on the technical relationship between
different groups of labour and goods, the dimension along which cooperation takes
place and finally on the number of externalities being taken into account under different
union structures. Revisiting the impact of
union structures on wages – integrating




Abstract: In a framework of a unionised oligopoly, this paper reconsiders the impact of
the bargaining structure on union wages. In particular, two dimensions along which
centralisation may occur, namely the professional and firm line, are integrated into one
modelling framework. It will be shown that, when taking into account different
centralisation dimensions, wage outcomes of different bargaining regimes cannot
simply be ranked according to the degree of bargaining centralisation. The argument
will be that negotiated wages rather depend on the technical relationship between
different groups of labour and goods as well as upon the dimension along which
centralisation takes place.
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Introduction
The degree of bargaining centralisation is widely perceived as an important
determinant of macroeconomic performance and economic competitiveness. In
Germany, for example, wage negotiations on sectoral and regional levels
(Flächentarifverhandlungen) recently have come under severe pressure. Considered as
responsible for wages being too inflexible with respect to their level and dispersion,
centralised industry-level bargaining is often blamed for the deterioration of German
firms’ international competitive position (see e.g. Hassel and Schulten, 1998, Berthold,
2001). Recent decentralisation tendencies at the professional lines, on the other hand,
have also been heavily criticised for being responsible for excessive wage demands
undermining wage solidarity within the German union movement. The most prominent
example are separate collective bargaining agreements being negotiated by the pilots’
trade union at German air carriers. Until 1999 pilots had been represented by the
German public sector union DAG. In 1999, their professional association Vereinigung
Cockpit (VC) decided to negotiate a collective bargaining agreement on its own, which
resulted in major pay increases (see EIROnline, 2001). 
The economic rationale behind the idea that the bargaining or union structure has a
considerable impact on the behaviour of real wages and unemployment is primarily
rooted in the work of Calmfors and Driffill (1988). Inspired by some empirical stylised
facts, the authors argue that there is a ‘hump-shaped’ (i.e. inverse U-shaped)
relationship between the degree of bargaining centralisation and unemployment, with
low unemployment and low real wages being associated with the most decentralised
and centralised systems, and high unemployment and high real wages being associated2
with intermediate levels of centralisation. In particular, the hump-shape arises from two
conflicting forces: on the one hand, as bargaining becomes more centralised, unions are
able to secure higher wages since they internalise positive externalities arising from
demand spill-over effects across firms (or industries) producing substitutable goods. On
the other hand, unions progressively take into account negative externalities since the
impact of the negotiated wage on the general consumption price-level becomes larger as
centralisation increases. Assuming that the elasticities of substitution between goods
become smaller at higher levels of aggregation, it is straightforward to see that at higher
levels of centralisation the internalisation of the negative price externality is likely to
dominate the positive externalities arising from demand spill-overs. This essentially
produces the ‘hump-shape’ since complete centralisation implies lower wages than
intermediate centralised wage bargaining. Other authors who developed similar models
to examine the impact of union cooperation on wage outcomes are Davidson (1988),
Dowrick (1989), Cahuc and Zylberberg (1991), and Hoel (1991).
As a consequence, according to the Calmfors-Driffill hypothesis, countries with
completely decentralised bargaining structures are generally expected to out-perform
countries with centralised industry-level bargaining in terms of real wages and
unemployment. However, the view that decentralised bargaining produces favourable
wage outcomes as compared to intermediate industry-level bargaining has been
challenged by several authors, who argue for a monotonic and negative relationship
between bargaining centralisation and wage outcomes. Their main argument is that
negative externalities are likely to be internalised even with intermediate bargaining
structures
1: Soskice (1990), for example, questions the superiority of decentralised
                                                
1 For an overview of externalities being internalised by centralised unions, see Calmfors (1993).3
bargaining in emphasising wage envy effects. He argues that workers in low profitable
firms are likely to use wage increases in high profitable firms to achieve higher wage
increases than they would have received with reference to their own firm’s profit level.
Another frequently invoked argument favouring industry-level bargaining asserts that
insider power may be more relevant at the firm level and that industry unions are more
likely to take into account adverse employment prospects for unemployed outsiders
when setting too high wages (see e.g. Moene et al., 1993, Fitzenberger  and Franz,
1999). These critics are confirmed by recent empirical studies which are not able to
support the superiority of decentralised as compared to intermediate industry-level
bargaining (see e.g. OECD, 1997), and which present evidence in favour of a negative
monotonic instead of a non-monotonic relationship between centralisation and wage
outcomes (see e.g. Soskice, 1990, Blanchard and Wolfers, 2000)
2. 
Apart from the objections raised above, another argument against the superiority of
decentralised bargaining refers to the dimensions along which centralisation occurs. A
core assumption of the Calmfors-Driffill model is that union cooperation takes place
between firms or industries producing substitutable goods and that workers are
organised by either firm- or industry-specific unions. However, as already mentioned at
the outset, there is another relevant dimension of centralisation which refers to the
professional line since workers of different professions may be organised in separate
craft unions. This type of (de)centralisation is commonly labelled as ‘horizontal’
(de)centralisation, whereas cooperation across firms or industries is usually referred to
as ‘vertical’ centralisation (Calmfors, 1993, Moene et al., 1993). Bargaining fragments
along craft lines mainly in the UK, in the Scandinavian countries, and in Australia. In
                                                
2 For a brief summary of the most recent studies, see Calmfors (2001).4
Australia, craft-specific bargaining tended to be coordinated across different firms and
industrial sectors until the late 1980s. However, since the beginning of the 1990s there
has been an increasing trend towards decentralisation of bargaining across firms and
towards centralisation across crafts (see e.g. Dowrick, 1993, Katz, 1993). In
Scandinavia, there are separate union federations for blue collar, white collar and
professional workers which negotiate industry- or nation-wide collective bargaining
agreements (see e.g. Flanagan, 1999). Firm-specific craft unions, in contrast, are
prevalent in the UK. Craft-specific bargaining in the UK is generally uncoordinated
across different firms or industries, but may either be coordinated or uncoordinated
across different craft unions on the firm level. Although the extent of uncoordinated
bargaining within one workplace has been decreasing during the last decades in the UK,
there is still a significant proportion of firms with multiple unions being engaged in
separate bargains (Pencavel, 2002). While in many continental European countries
professional unions traditionally play no major role, there are yet some sector-specific
tendencies for wage bargaining to fragment along professional lines, as for example in
the German air carriers industry. In response to separate wage bargains struck by the
pilots’ union VC (Vereinigung Cockpit), several other split-ups of employee
associations are being discussed, notably by the Independent Association of Flight
Attendants (Unabhängige Flugbegleiter Organisation) and by the Association of Ground
Crew (Vereinigung Boden) (see EIROnline, 2001).
The economic implications of craft-unionism have already been analysed by Horn
and Wolinsky (1988) and Dowrick (1993). These authors show that cooperation
between unions representing different work groups which are complements in
production leads to lower wages. Horn and Wolinsky (1988), who assume an5
exogenously given labour demand, argue that complementary work groups bargaining
separately over wages are able to inflict substantial harm on the firm and do not take
into account losses inflicted on other work groups in case of a strike. Assuming variable
labour demand, Dowrick (1993) additionally emphasises that cooperating craft unions
internalise the fact that higher wages for one professional work group will reduce labour
demand for the other work group
3. Although it has been widely recognised in the
literature that the effects of the two types of centralisation are likely to work into
opposite directions (Calmfors and Driffill, 1988, Calmfors, 1993, Moene et al., 1993),
no comprehensive analysis has been undertaken yet so as to combine vertical and
horizontal centralisation. The present analysis attempts to fill this gap and integrates the
two dimensions along which centralisation may occur into one modelling framework.
As country-specific bargaining structures typically vary along horizontal as well as
vertical lines, such an analysis proves to be particularly important in order to evaluate
the relative wage performance of different bargaining structures in an international
context. In an international context, the fact that cooperation may take place across
crafts, firms/industries, or both raises for example the interesting question whether
completely decentralised bargaining structures with firm-specific craft unions (like in
the UK) still out-perform sectoral centralised bargaining, e.g. in Germany, where
industry unions typically encompass all workers of a particular industry. It will be
shown that, when taking into account the different centralisation dimensions, wage
outcomes of different bargaining regimes cannot simply be ranked according to the
degree of bargaining centralisation. The argument will be that negotiated wages rather
                                                
3 Empirical evidence for these results is found by Machin et al. (1993). The authors report that UK firms
bargaining separately with multiple unions pay higher wages than firms bargaining either with one single
union or with multiple unions which are cooperating.6
depend on the technical relationship between different groups of labour and goods as
well as upon the dimension along which cooperation takes place. 
The modelling framework which is used to integrate the different dimensions of
centralisation is borrowed from Dowrick (1993), who analyses different bargaining
structures in the presence of craft unions in an oligopolistic product market. More
specifically, Dowrick confines his attention to the consequences of cooperation between
craft unions either at the firm level or at the industry level, but neglects complete
centralisation of unions along craft and firm lines. The latter case would be relevant in
order to assess the relative wage performance of bargaining regimes in the UK and e.g.
in Germany. The purpose of the present paper is therefore to establish a complete
ranking of different bargaining scenarios. Moreover, in contrast to Dowrick (1993), who
considers the 22-case of a duopoly with two firms and crafts, we will extend the
analysis to the more general case of n firms and m crafts, since intuitively one might
suppose that there are generally more firms than crafts within an industry. In what
follows, the focus will be on the comparison of decentralised and intermediate union
structures. This appears to be justifiable when analysing sector-specific union structures
in industries whose unions neglect macroeconomic externalities. The remainder of the
analysis will be organised as follows: Section 1 investigates the case of two firms and
two crafts and analyses different bargaining structures for general demand, utility and
production functions. Section 2 considers the case of specific functional forms and
extends the analysis to the more general case of n firms and m crafts. The analysis then
enables us to highlight the importance of the number of positive and negative
externalities being internalised by unions, when assessing the relative wage7
performance of alternative centralisation scenarios. Finally, Section 3 provides some
conclusions.
1. Integrating vertical and horizontal centralisation– the case of general
utility, demand and production functions
Following Dowrick (1993), consider a duopoly with firm 1 and 2, each employing
two types of workers or crafts, 1 and 2. Both groups are assumed to be complements in
production, i.e. an increase in the employment of one group raises the marginal product
of the other group. This seems to be a reasonable assumption, with type 1 and 2, for
example, representing production and non-production workers. For the time being, the
analysis shall be conducted for general utility, demand and production functions.
Moreover, firms behave either according to Cournot or Bertrand conjectures in the
product market. Each firm’s labour demand can be written as
                         L
ik = L
ik (w11, w21, w12, w22 ),  i, k = 1, 2,  (1)
with L
ik denoting labour demand of firm k for labour of type i and wik
 denoting type i
workers’ remuneration in firm k. Assuming homogeneous production technologies and
regular product demand functions, L
11, for example, can be shown to exhibit the
following properties
4:








11       L L L L ,( 2 )8
where 
ik
jl L  denotes the partial derivative of L
ik  with respect to wjl,  i, j, k, l = 1, 2. 
11 L
decreases with w11 and w21 since workers are assumed to be complements in production.
Moreover, 
11 L  increases with w12 and w22 if the firms’ products are substitutes.
Conversely, the signs in brackets apply if firms produce complementary products.
For the time being, workers in each firm are assumed to be organised in craft- and
firm-specific unions ik. Each union is assumed to maximise a general utility function
U
ik, which is increasing in both wages and employment (see Oswald, 1982) and which
represents the preferences of type i workers in firm k. According to eq. (1), union
preferences can then be rewritten as
                               U
ik = U
ik (w11, w21, w12, w22),  i, k = 1, 2.  (3)
Due to the cross-employment effects, as given by ineqs. (2), we have, for example, for
U
11:






21      U U U ,( 4 )
where 
ik
jl U  denotes the partial derivative of U
ik  with respect to wjl, i, j, k, l = 1, 2.
Analogous to ineqs. (2), the terms in brackets apply if the firms produce goods that are
complements. The present model with two firms and two types of workers gives rise to
a variety of bargaining structures:
                                                                                                                                         
4 Let Pi be the price and xi the output of firm i, with i = 1, 2. It can easily be verified that with Cournot
competition and general product demand Pi = Pi(x1, x2), a sufficient condition for each firm’s output to
increase (decrease) in the rival’s wage is that Pij < (>) 0 if the products are substitutes (complements),
where i, j = 1,2 and i     j. Moreover, with Bertrand competition and a general demand function xi =
d(P1,P2), a sufficient condition for each firm’s output to increase with the rival’s wage is that dii and dij be
negative if products are substitutes. Conversely, a sufficient condition for each firm’s output to decrease
with the rival’s wage is that dii < 0 and dij > 0 if products are complements.9
  Completely decentralised bargaining takes place with 4 firm- and craft-specific
unions, each bargaining independently of the other unions, henceforth denoted
as (FC).
  Intermediate centralisation would be represented either by two firm-specific
unions (F), each of which organises workers of type 1 and 2, or, alternatively,
by two industry-craft unions (IC), each of which organises one type of workers
across the industry.
  The completely centralised case occurs if all unions amalgamate into one
encompassing industry union, which organises both type 1 and 2 workers in
firm 1 and 2, denoted as case (I).
While Dowrick (1993) confines his attention to the comparison between (FC) and
(F) as well as between (FC) and (IC), the purpose of the present analysis is to establish
a complete ranking between the aforementioned bargaining scenarios. According to the
monopoly-union and right-to-manage approach (see Nickell and Andrews, 1983), it is
assumed that unions unilaterally set wages and firms unilaterally decide on the
employment level
5. As will be seen, a relative ranking of the wage outcomes associated
with the different bargaining structures then simply requires a comparison of the
unions’ first order conditions. In the following analysis the focus will be on wage
outcomes of type 1 workers in firm 1. Under the assumption that the two type of
workers as well as unions and firms are symmetric, involving that unions and firms
                                                
5 A straightforward extension of the monopoly-union approach would be to consider a bargaining model,
which entails a variety of possible bargaining structures concerning cooperation on the employers’ side.
Moreover, in a bargaining model, different bargaining structures give rise to different disagreement
utilities of the bargaining parties. For a detailed discussion, see Dowrick (1993).10
maximise symmetric objective functions, analogous results may be derived for type 2
workers and workers in firm 2.
1.1.   4 firm- and craft-specific unions (FC)
Consider as a benchmark scenario the case of completely decentralised,
uncoordinated bargaining with 4 firm- and craft-specific unions. Each union sets its
wage independently of the other unions. The first-order condition for union 11 solves
                                                     0
11
11  U , (5)
which defines implicitly  ) , , ( 22 12 21 11 w w w w
FC . Symmetric conditions represent the
reaction functions of the other unions, whose intersection yields the (symmetric)
equilibrium wage vector w
FC =  ) , , , ( 22 12 21 11
FC FC FC FC w w w w
6. To compare w
FC with the
outcome of an alternative bargaining scenario , where  = F, IC, I, evaluate the first-
order condition 

11 U  at the wage vector, w
FC, which solves condition (5). Given the
second-order condition that 

11 U  is decreasing in w11, 

11 U (w
FC) < 0 would imply that
) , , ( 22 12 21 11 w w w w
FC >) , , ( 22 12 21 11 w w w w
 , i.e the reaction functions as compared to the
case (FC) shift inwards. Conversely, 

11 U (w
FC) > 0 would imply that the reaction
functions shift outwards. An inward shift of the reaction functions is illustrated in
Figure 1 for the two-dimensional case with two craft unions within one firm, where the
subscript referring to the firm is suppressed for convenience:  
                                                
6 In what follows, bold print letters will be used to represent equilibrium wage vectors.11
                         Figure 1: Shift of the reaction functions and new equilibrium wage vector
From Figure 1 it can be seen that the inward shift of the reaction functions involves that
in equilibrium w
 < w
FC. The Appendix discusses sufficient conditions guaranteeing that
an inward (outward) shift of the reaction functions leads to a lower (higher) equilibrium
wage vector. More specifically, it is shown that this is the case, as long as the stability
conditions for a symmetric equilibrium hold. As a consequence, when comparing two
bargaining scenarios, the sign of the change in w is generally determined by the sign of
the change in the first-order condition evaluated at the reference wage vector.
1.2.  2 firm-specific unions (F) 
In this scenario, the craft-specific unions in each firm amalgamate into two




21. Due to the symmetry assumption, union 1 sets a common wage w
F
1
= w11= w21. The first-order condition of union F1 is given by
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implicitly defining  ) , , ( 22 12 21 11 w w w w
F . Symmetric expressions hold for union F2,
yielding w
F as the equilibrium wage vector associated with firm-specific bargaining. To
compare w
F with w
FC, evaluate the first-order condition (6) at the wage vector, w
FC,






11 U  < 0. Given the second-order condition that 
1
11
F U  is decreasing in w11,
this implies that  ) , , ( 22 12 21 11 w w w w
FC >) , , ( 22 12 21 11 w w w w
F , i.e the reaction functions as
compared to the case (FC) shift inwards. Hence, if the workers are complements in
production, the cooperation of two craft-specific unions gives rise to a lower wage since
the encompassing union internalises the fact that any wage rise obtained for one group
of workers reduces employment for the other group (see Dowrick, 1993). 
1.3. 2 craft-specific industry unions (IC)
Now consider the case if the craft-specific unions in firm 1 and 2 merge to form two




12. Setting a symmetric wage w
IC
1 = w11= w12, union IC1’s optimal wage solves
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IC .( 7 )
A symmetric condition holds for union IC2. Evaluating eq. (7) at w
FC, it is






11 U > (<) 0. That
is, an industry-craft union takes into account cross effects on labour demand, the
direction of which depends on whether the firms produce goods that are substitutes or
complements. With the products being substitutes, a wage rise in firm 1 leads to
increased employment in firm 2. An industry craft union internalises this positive13
demand spill-over effect, so that w
IC > w
FC. Conversely, with the products being
complements, a wage rise in firm 1 reduces employment in firm 2, thereby inducing the
industry-craft union to set a lower wage, so that w
IC < w
FC  (see Dowrick, 1993).
To compare w
IC with w
F, evaluation of eq. (7) at w









11 U U   , which is unambiguously positive if the products are substitutes, so that
w
IC > w
F. The reason is that, unlike the firm-specific union F1, industry-craft union IC1
disregards adverse employment effects of a wage rise for type 2 workers in firm 1, but
internalises the positive demand spill-over effect of a wage rise in firm 1, benefiting
type 1 workers in firm 2. 








11 U U    cannot be signed
unambiguously. This is because industry-craft union IC1 on the one hand disregards
adverse employment effects of a wage rise for type 2 workers in firm 1, but
simultaneously takes into account negative employment effects of a wage rise in firm 1
for type 1 workers in firm 2. The relationship between w
IC and w
F therefore depends on
which of the two effects is the dominating one. 
1.4. One encompassing industry union (I)
As a last scenario, consider the case of one industry-specific union I, representing
the interests of all crafts 1 and 2 in firm 1 and 2. The encompassing union’s utility





22. The first-order condition solves
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Evaluating eq. (8) at w






11 U U   > (<) 0. I.e.,
whether one encompassing industry union sets a higher industry wage than two firm-
specific unions depends on the nature of product rivalry. With the products being
substitutes, one obtains w
I > w
F since the industry union internalises positive demand
spill-over effects across firms
7. Conversely, with the products being complements, an
industry union moderates its wage demand as compared to firm-specific unions due to
negative demand spill-overs across firms.
In order to rank w
I and w
IC, evaluate eq. (8) at w






11 U U   < 0 it follows that, if the products are complements, an industry union
unambiguously settles for a lower wage than an industry craft union, i.e. w
I  < w
IC. The
mechanism behind this result is that an industry-wide union additionally takes into
account that a rise in w11 has negative employment consequences for type 2 workers in






11 U U   is ambiguous in sign. While an industry union internalises negative
employment effects across crafts, it simultaneously takes into account positive demand
spill-over effects of a rise in w11 for type 2 workers in firm 2. 
To compare w
I with w
FC, consider expression (8) evaluated at w








11 U U U    < 0 it follows that an industry union unambiguously
moderates its wage demand as compared to firm-specific craft unions if the products are
complements. The rationale behind this result is that an industry union simultaneously
                                                
7 Note that this is actually the line of reasoning of Calmfors and Driffill (1988). A similar result has been
derived independently by Davidson (1988).15
takes into account negative employment effects across crafts as well as firms. If,
however, the products are substitutes, w
I and w
FC cannot be ranked unambiguously
since the industry union now internalises negative cross-employment effects across
crafts, but positive employment effects across firms. Finally, the results of the present
section are summarised in the following proposition:
Proposition 1: Comparing the four different bargaining scenarios (FC), (F), (IC) and
(I), the following rankings with respect to the wage outcomes can be established:
(i) With the products being substitutes, it follows that
                                                    w
IC > w
FC   > w
F .
The only conclusion that can be drawn with respect to w
I is that 
                                                         w
I > w
F.
(ii) With the products being complements, the following ranking unambiguously holds
                                                    w
FC > w
F  > w
I .
The only conclusion that can be drawn with respect to w
IC is that 




2.  Integrating vertical and horizontal centralisation – the case of specific
functional forms
Proposition 1 highlights that with two dimensions of cooperation, only the case of
complementary products suggests a simple ranking of wage outcomes. More
specifically, if one identifies the degree of centralisation with the number of unions that
are cooperating, part (ii) provides support for a monotonic relationship between
centralisation and wage outcomes. Increased centralisation leads to lower wages since
with increased cooperation unions progressively take into account negative employment
effects across crafts and firms. With substitute goods, however, no simple ranking is
possible. As wage outcomes generally depend on the specific technical relationship
between the two types of workers and goods, the purpose of the present section is to
illustrate the results of the preceding section by means of an example with specific
functional forms. Restricting the attention to specific functional forms with no doubt
involves a considerable loss of generality. However, the gain is that the analysis can be
extended to the more general case of n firms and m crafts employed by each firm
without obtaining non-interpretable results. This appears to be a reasonable extension
since intuitively one might suppose that there are generally more firms than crafts
within an industry. The analysis then enables us to highlight the importance of the
number of positive and negative externalities being internalised by unions, when
assessing the relative wage performance of alternative centralisation scenarios.
Consider now an oligopoly, with n firms, each employing m types of workers or
crafts, and producing differentiated products x1, …, xn. The production function shall be
given by a simple Leontief technology, i.e. 17
                                   xk = min {L
1k,..., L
mk},  k = 1, …, n. (9)
Product demand is assumed to be linear, with 
                                          Pk = 1 – xk - c 
 k l
l x , k, l = 1, …, n. (10)
with c   1 ; 1    representing the degree of product rivalry. If c is negative, the following
restriction is required to guarantee strict concavity in the firms’ optimisation problems: 
                                                           c  < 1/(n-1) (11)
The firms’ profit functions take the form
                            k = (1 – xk - c 
 k l







, k, l = 1,…, n. (12)
Assuming that firms compete in quantities, maximising each firm’s profit function with
respect to xk, taking xl as given, yields the following mn labour demand functions: 
. ,..., 1 ,
) 2 ))( 1 ( 2 (
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     (13)
Eq. (13) reveals that each firm’s output depends positively (negatively) on wages
prevailing in the rival firms if c > (<) 0.
Moreover, each firm’s output depends negatively on its own wages since by virtue of
eq. (11) the expression (2 + c(n - 2))/((2 + c(n - 1))(2 - c)) can be shown to be positive.18
Unions are assumed to maximise the wage bill, i.e. each firm- and craft-specific union’s
ik preferences are given by:
                                        U
ik = wik
 L
ik,  i = 1,…, m; k = 1,…, n. (14)
2.1.  m n firm- and craft-specific unions
The first-order condition of union ik, setting its wage independently of the other
(mn – 1) unions is given by
                  
) 2 ))( 1 ( 2 (





ik   
 
  = 0,  i = 1,…, m; k = 1,…, n, (15)
which gives rise to the following mn reaction functions
8:
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k l , (16)
where w  denotes the wage vector of (mn – 1) wages set by the rival firm-specific  craft
unions. Symmetric reaction functions hold for the other unions. Solving the mn first-
order conditions for a symmetric equilibrium yields the following equilibrium wage: 
                                            w
FC = 
2 ) 2 ( ) 2 (
2
   

n c c m
c
. (17)
                                                
8 In the following, the superscripts FC, F, IC and I will be dropped for convenience.19
Eq. (17) reveals that w
FC depends negatively on the number of crafts, m. The intuition
here is that the more crafts are necessary to produce one unit of output, the higher the
firms’ marginal costs and the lower the output level. This reduces the marginal benefit
to raise the wage and therefore leads to wage moderation on behalf of unions.
Moreover, as expected, w
FC is decreasing (increasing) in the number of firms, n, if c >
(<) 0, which represents the number of positive (negative) externalities not being taken
into account by completely decentralised firm-specific unions.
2.2.  n firm-specific unions (Fk)
The first-order condition of union Fk, k = 1,…,n, setting its wage independently of
the other (n - 1) firm-specific unions solves
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Imposing a symmetric wage outcome wk = w1k = … = wmk, eq. (18) defines the
following n reaction functions
                                wk (w )   












,  k, l = 1,…, n, (19)
where  w  denotes the wage vector of (n – 1) wages set by the rival firm unions. Solving
eq. (19) and imposing symmetric reaction functions for the (n - 1) rival unions Fl,
k l   , one obtains the following equilibrium wage vector:
                               w
F = w1 = … = wn = 







2.3. m craft-specific industry unions (ICi)
The first-order condition of union ICi, i = 1,…, m, setting its wage independently of
the (m - 1) rival industry-craft unions ICj,  i j   , is given by
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Imposing a symmetric wage outcome wi = wi1 = … = win, eq. (21) defines the following
m reaction functions










,  i,  j = 1,…, m, (22)
where  w  denotes the wage vector of (m – 1) wages set by the rival industry-craft
unions. Solving eq. (22) and imposing symmetric reaction functions for unions j,  i j   ,
one obtains the following equilibrium wage vector
                                            w





Note that with craft-specific industry unions, the equilibrium wage is independent of the
number of firms in the industry, n, and the degree of product rivalry, c. The rationale
behind this result is that an industry-craft union sets a uniform craft-specific wage for21
all firms in the industry, so that the number of firms, n, and the degree of product
rivalry, c, do not affect the unions’ trade-off between wages and employment
9. 
2.4. One encompassing industry union (I)
The first-order condition of the encompassing industry union, setting a uniform
wage for all firms and crafts is given by
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Imposing a symmetric wage outcome w
I for all i = 1,…, m; k = 1,…, n, one obtains the
following equilibrium wage vector





As with industry-craft unions, the industry wage does not depend on n and c since  the
industry-union sets a uniform wage for all firms. Finally, closer inspection of the
equilibrium wage outcomes establishes the following proposition:
                                                
9 For the homogeneous good case and for only one type of craft, this result has already been derived by
Dowrick (1989).22
Proposition 2: Comparing the four different bargaining scenarios (FC), (F), (IC) and
(I) and assuming linear demand functions and a Leontief technology, the following
rankings with respect to the wage outcomes can be established: with the products being
imperfect substitutes (0 < c < 1) , it follows that
(i)                              w
IC > w
FC  > w
I  > w
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(ii)                              w
IC > w
I  > w
FC  > w
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 With the products being imperfect complements (-1/(n-1) < c < 0), the following
ranking unambiguously holds
(iii)                           w
FC > w
IC  > w
F  > w
I,     if 








(iv)                            w
FC > w
F  > w
IC  > w
I,     if 








Proof: See the Appendix.
For general demand functions and technologies, the results of the previous section
have shown that w
I and w
FC cannot be ranked unambiguously if the products are
substitutes. The reason is that an industry union simultaneously internalises negative
cross-employment effects across crafts and positive employment effects across firms.
Hence, which of the two effects dominates essentially depends on the relationship
between the number of negative externalities, m, and the number of positive
externalities,  n, whose extent is strongly affected by the degree of product
substitutability, c. Intuitively, the difference between w
FC and w
I may be expected to be
the larger, the less positive externalities and the more negative externalities are
internalised by an industry-wide union. Part (i) and (ii) of Proposition 2 establish some23
critical level for m above which w
FC exceeds w
I. Indeed, it may easily be checked that
the smaller n and c, the more likely is m to exceed this critical level. With respect to an
international comparison, this result therefore suggests that countries with completely
decentralised bargaining structures, as represented by firm-specific craft unions, need
not necessarily out-perform countries with sectoral centralised bargaining if the negative
cross-employment effect across crafts dominates positive demand spill-over effects
across firms or industries. Whether this will be the case depends strongly on the number
of firms in the industry, the number of crafts being employed by each firm, and the
degree of craft-/product substitutability or complementarity. While the fact that there are
usually more firms than crafts within one industry tends to favour the superiority of
decentralised bargaining, the case for the superiority of centralised bargaining ought to
be the stronger, the more firms in a particular industry produce complementary goods
10.
This ambiguity is particularly reinforced by the argument that an industry union
encompassing firms producing complementary goods becomes particularly likely at
very high levels of centralisation
11. I.e., a large number of firms, n, will generally
involve an increasing number of firms generating negative cross-employment effects
owing to complementary products. 
                                                
10 However, this is not explicitly incorporated into the model since the degree of product rivalry, c, has
been assumed to be identical for all n firms. Moreover, at this point it is worthy to note that the
coexistence of intermediate input goods and final goods generates a similar cross-employment externality.
If labour and intermediate inputs are complements in production, a wage rise in firms producing final
(intermediate input) goods imposes a negative cross-employment effect on firms producing intermediate
input (final) goods (see e.g. Calmfors, 1993). However, this externality works through the production
technology, which is not explicitly modelled here.
11 This argument has also been made by Calmfors and Driffill in favour of their hump-shape hypothesis
(Calmfors and Driffill, 1988, p. 45).24
With the product being substitutes and general demand functions and technologies, a
further ambiguous ranking has been derived for w
IC and w
I. The rationale is that an
industry-wide union, as compared to an industry-craft union, additionally internalises
negative employment effects across crafts, but simultaneously takes into account
positive demand spill-over effects of a wage rise for all type of workers in the rest of the
industry. Here, with products being imperfect substitutes and a Leontief-technology,
cross-employment effects arising from the strong complementary factor relationship
dominate any positive demand spill-over effects across firms, so that an industry-wide
union unambiguously sets a lower wage than craft-specific industry unions. Note that
the comparison between an industry-wide union wage and industry-wide craft-specific
wages would be relevant for the evaluation of the decentralisation process being
observed at German air carriers if the emerging professional unions encompassed all
workers of a given profession across the whole industry. The present results therefore
suggest that the current split-up of employee associations is the more likely to lead to
higher wage outcomes the stronger the complementary factor relationship between
different professional groups. 
Moreover, with the products being complements, a further ambiguous ranking has
been shown to hold for w
F and w
IC. The reason is that industry-craft unions take into
account negative employment effects of a wage rise for workers in the rest of the
industry, whereas firm-specific unions internalise adverse employment effects of a wage
rise for all types of crafts employed in the firm. Hence, which of the two effects
dominates again depends on the relationship between the number of negative
externalities, m, being internalised by firm-specific unions and the number of negative
externalities, n, which are affected by the degree of product complementarity, c, and are25
internalised by industry-craft unions. Intuitively, the difference between w
IC and w
F may
be expected to be the larger, the less negative externalities are internalised by industry-
craft unions and the more negative externalities are taken into account by firm-specific
unions. Part (iii) and (iv) of Proposition 2 establish some critical level for m above
which w
IC exceeds w
F. It may easily be verified that the smaller n and the smaller the
absolute value of c, the more likely is m to exceed this critical level.
3. Conclusions
The present paper has demonstrated the importance of different dimensions of
centralisation, when assessing the relative wage performance of decentralised and
centralised bargaining structures. In particular, it has been shown that wage outcomes of
different bargaining regimes cannot simply be ranked according to the degree of
bargaining centralisation since wage outcomes depend on the specific technical
relationship between different groups of labour and goods as well as upon the
dimension along which cooperation takes place. With respect to an international
comparison, it has been shown that countries with completely decentralised bargaining
structures, as represented by firm-specific craft unions, need not necessarily out-perform
countries with sectoral centralised bargaining if the negative cross-employment effect
across crafts dominates positive demand spill-over effects across firms or industries.
Whether this will be the case depends strongly on the number of firms in the industry,
the number of crafts being employed by each firm, and the degree of craft-/product
substitutability or complementarity. When comparing country-specific union structures
it should be emphasised that the present analysis has neglected union centralisation on
the national level. However, since the ranking of different union structures turns out to
be ambiguous even when confining the attention to decentralised and intermediate26
structures, the only gain of the internalisation of macroeconomic externalities would be
to add  further ambiguities to the results. In any case, the present analysis suggests that
with different dimensions of centralisation, particular caution is necessary when
classifying countries with respect to their bargaining structures and that the focus on
vertical centralisation may provide an imperfect guide to the assessment of the relative
wage performance of different bargaining structures. In light of the limited numbers of
observations being used in empirical cross-country analyses, this may help to explain
the difficulties of recent empirical studies in revealing a clear pattern of correlations
between measures of macroeconomic performance and the degree of bargaining
centralisation. 27
Appendix 
Let the bargaining structure be parameterised by a shift-parameter , determining the
movement of the unions’ reaction functions. This defines the unions’ first-order
conditions as 
                             ) , , , , ( 22 12 21 11  w w w w U
ik
ik  = 0, i, k =  1, 2.  (A.1)
Totally differentiating the four first-order conditions yields
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ik
jl ik U ,  denotes the partial derivative of 
ik
ik U  with respect to wjl and 
ik
ik U  ,  denotes the
partial derivative of 
ik




jl ik U U , ,  ,
i, j, k, l = 1, 2, we obtain a symmetric matrix, denoted as A, on the left-hand side of eq.
(A.2). For a symmetric matrix, sufficient and necessary conditions for the equilibrium to
be stable are that the upper left-hand principal minors of the above system alternate in
sign (see e.g. Gandolfo, 1997, p. 252). In particular, stability conditions then require
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 , DET(A) > 0.  (A.3)
Comparative static effects of a change in  on wik may be derived by applying Cramer’s
rule. For example, for w11 it follows that28
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eq. (A.4) may be simplified to
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 .( A . 9 )
Condition (A.7) imposes symmetric second-order effects across different crafts within
one firm, whereas condition (A.8) imposes symmetric second-order effects across
wages in different firms, independent of the relevant craft. From eq. (A.9) it follows that
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, (A.10)
which, by virtue of eqs. (A.3), unambiguously takes the sign of  .
11
, 11  U29
Proposition 2:
The following comparison of the equilibrium wage outcomes is derived for n > 1, m > 1
and relies on the following restriction for the parameter c:
                                        0 for 
1
1
  and 1 ; 1 

   c
n
c c . (A.11)
In particular, from (A.11) it follows that (2 + c(n - 2)) > 0 and (4 + c(n - 3)) > 0.
1) Comparison of  w
IC and w
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From (A.14) it follows that, for c < 0, w
I < w
FC  for all m, n > 1, since 
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4) Comparison of  w
I and w
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5) Comparison of  w
IC and w
F :
                          
)) 3 ( 4 )( 1 (
) 1 ( 2 ) 2 (
  
   
 
n c m m
c m n mc
w w
F IC (A.16)
From (A.16) it can be seen that w
IC > w
F  for c > 0. For c < 0  it follows that 
F IC w w

  , if 
                                                     









6) Comparison of  w
I and w
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